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FEATURE ARTICLES
Employee Beware:
the Irreparable Damage of the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
By John H. Matheson
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business information, such as customer lists,
marketing plans, and other commercial
intangibles.
A critical issue arises when a worker with
access to confidential business information
leaves one employer to work for a competitor.
In one sense, the employee is simply acting
rationally to increase his or her overall
satisfaction as a consumer of employment.
From the former employer's perspective,
however, the result of the employee's choice
may be sharing valuable trade secrets with the
new employer.
In circumstances where an employee moves
to ajob similar to his or her previous job,
employers sometimes seek to prevent the
worker from accepting the new employment by
arguing that the worker's new position will
inevitably result in the disclosure of trade
secrets to the new employer. The disclosure of
trade secrets to the new employer is known as
the "inevitable disclosure doctrine." Some
courts have accepted this theory of "inevitable
disclosure," and have enjoined the employee
from working at the new job, in effect creating
ajudicially fashioned non-competition
agreement. This result may leave the employee
without recourse, except to find work in a job
or industry unrelated to the former employer's
business. Consequently, the worker's skills and
marketability are devalued. In essence, the
employer's information provides post-
employment prophylactic protection at the cost
of the worker's loss of personal freedom.
This article argues that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine operates to harm the
employee/consumer like a latent defect in a
product harms consumers. The employee's
initial employment package does not reflect the
cost that the employee ultimately may bear in
terms of restricted mobility. Because this cost is
hidden, workers cannot make rational decisions
when comparing alternative employment
opportunities, which is particularly unfortunate
since employers have both the legal means and
the comparative information advantage to
protect themselves in advance by means of
negotiated non-compete provisions.
An understanding of basic trade secret law,
the remedies available to employers for trade
secret misappropriation, and the ways in which
employers can protect themselves in advance is
crucial to exploring the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. Part II of this article explores the
development of trade secret law and the
remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets.
Part III addresses the nature of the employment
relationship and the means by which employers
can protect their confidential information and
other trade secrets. Part IV analyzes the
inevitable disclosure doctrine and proposes its
rejection when used for purposes of creating an
ex post facto restriction on worker mobility,
arguing that the courts should not rush to
rescue employers who have not taken
precautions to protect themselves.
II. Trade Secrets and Remedies for
Misappropriation
Trade secret law provides intellectual
property protection that is different from that
provided by patent' and copyright laws.2 Trade
secret law offers the possibility of substantial
protection for confidential information with
relative ease. For example, trade secret
protection does not require application forms
or filing fees normally associated with patents
and copyrights. Generally, trade secret law
provides a business or individual with a legal
method to safeguard confidential information
by protecting "commercial intangibles."3
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Balanced against this goal of protection is
the policy of free and open competition.4 While
an understandable desire exists to acknowledge
ownership of an alleged trade secret when it
appears that another has copied it, unpatented
information is prevalent, and courts have
recognized that competition may not always be
fair. "Competition is ruthless, unprincipled,
uncharitable, unforgiving--and a boon to
society."5
A. The Evolution of Trade Secret
Protection
The theory of trade secret protection
evolved under common law. Early trade secret
decisions varied from state to state, with only
moderate uniformity in interpretation.
However, the American Law Institute
published the Restatement (First) of Torts
("First Restatement") in 1939. Section 757 of
this Restatement represented the first attempt
to set forth a national definition of trade
secrets, requirements for protection, and
remedies for misappropriation.6 Although the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1978)
purposefully omitted numerous sections of the
First Restatement, including those relating to
trade secrets, courts continued to apply the
definitions provided by § 757 of the First
Restatement. The recently approved
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
(1995) presents a revised statement of trade
secret law.
While § 757 in the First Restatement
provided some guidance and uniformity to
trade secret law, confusion remained. In 1979,
the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Trade
Secrets Act ("UTSA"). The legislatures of
thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the UTSA, with varying
modifications.7 Two different perspectives
regarding the underlying basis of the UTSA
exist. On one hand, some courts have found
that the First Restatement was the basic source
for the UTSA's definition of trade secrets.8
These courts interpret the UTSA as applying
the principles set forth in § 757 of the First
Restatement. 9 However, other courts view the
UTSA as merely displacing conflicting tort,
restitutionary, and other laws regarding civil
liability for misappropriation.10
B. Defining Trade Secrets
Analysis of trade secret protection must
begin by identifying what is meant by "trade
secret." According to comment (b) of § 757 of
the First Restatement, a "trade secret" is:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who
do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound,
a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a
pattern for a machine or other
device, or a list of customers.1'
The UTSA defined "trade secret" in a
somewhat more substantive manner than the
First Restatement:
Trade secret means information,
including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic
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value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from the
disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy. 12
The UTSA's definition of trade secret thus
expands upon the somewhat theoretical criteria
of the First Restatement's definition and
articulates a more objective means for
determining whether a given item of
information constitutes a "trade secret."
C. Elements of a "Trade Secret"
1.
Value
Trade Secrets Possess Economic
For trade secrets to be protected under the
UTSA, the trade secret must provide the owner
with some commercial advantage or economic
value. The term "economic value" refers to the
"value of the information to either the owner or
a competitor," including information "that
would be useful to a competitor and would
require cost, time, and effort to duplicate."' 3 In
other words, where a competitor would
materially benefit from knowing the
information and would have to spend time and
money to create the same information
independently (if not for disclosure of the
information), the information has economic
value.14 A former employer can prove
commercial or economic value circumstantially
by proving a former employee's intent to use or
actual use of the information, i" or by
establishing "the time and money...
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reasonably expended in developing"' 6 the
information in question.
2. Information Not Generally
Known or Readily Ascertainable
To be accorded trade secret status under the
UTSA, the information in question must not be
readily ascertainable by proper means.
Specifically, if competitors can discover the
allegedly proprietary information by merely
examining an existing product that is publicly
available and incorporates the trade secret, the
information is not a trade secret under the
UTSA. Whether information is readily
accessible or easily discoverable by proper
means is a question of fact. Discovering the
accessibility of information requires a factual
determination of the time and money employed
to develop the information. Also, courts must
discover how much time and money a
competitor would expend in independently
developing the information.17 Publication of the
trade secret information destroys its status as a
trade secret;' 8 however, such disclosure must
be sufficient "to translate the theoretical
concepts described into practical application."19
3. Reasonable Efforts to Maintain
Secrecy
The owner of the information must utilize
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy; the
trade secret must be, in fact, secret.20 Deciding
whether information was intended to be secret
entails a number of factual inquiries. As a
starting point, the "reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy" element does not require the
owner to maintain absolute secrecy over its
information; only partial secrecy or qualified
secrecy is required. 2' Furthermore, "a trade
Volume 10, number 2
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secret does not lose its character when the
owner confidentially discloses it to agents or
employees." Agents and employees need to
know these "trade secrets" in order to convert
the information into value for the company. 22
Courts have identified a number of factors in
determining whether a person or company has
employed reasonable steps to maintain secrecy:
(1) keeping secret documents in locked files;23
(2) providing guarded entrances to a plant;24 (3)
restricting visitors and requiring badges for all
employees; 25 (4) using non-disclosure
agreements with subcontractors; 26 and (5)
incorporating a system of passwords to protect
secrecy of computer data and software.27
The owner of an asserted trade secret must
actually enforce its secrecy policy. Mere
possession of subjective intent to treat
something as secret does not suffice.28 When
reviewing these secrecy steps, courts require
only reasonable precautions.29 Companies need
not "guard against the unanticipated, the
undetectable, or the unpreventable methods of
espionage now available" or create an
"impenetrable fortress. 30 As discussed in
Section IV below, this element plays an
important role in the proper application of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine.
D. Misappropriation of Trade
Secrets
The First Restatement explicitly provided
that improper disclosure or use of a trade
secret was actionable:
One who discloses or uses another's
trade secret, without a privilege to do
so, is liable to the other if...
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a
breach of confidence reposed in him
by the other in disclosing the secret
to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third
person with notice of the fact that it
was a secret and... that the third
person's disclosure of it was
otherwise a breach of his duty to the
other .... .1
The recently enacted Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition expands the
concept of misappropriation articulated in the
First Restatement. Section 40 of the
Restatement (Third) divides misappropriation
of trade secrets into two areas. First, one is
subject to liability for misappropriation of
another's trade secret if that person acquires
the information by improper means.32 Second, a
person is subject to liability for the
misappropriation of another's trade secret if he
or she improperly uses or discloses the other's
trade secret without the other's consent, when
the trade secret was brought to his or her
attention through a confidential relationship,
was acquired by improper means, or was
acquired from another who was in breach of a
confidential relationship or was disclosed by
accident or mistake.33
The UTSA's definition of trade secret
misappropriation is quite similar to that of the
Restatement (Third). This is not surprising
because the Third Restatement was drafted
after the UTSA had been accepted and
practiced. Therefore, the drafters of the Third
Restatement quite plausibly had the UTSA in
mind. The UTSA defines improper acquisition,
disclosure or use as acts of misappropriation.
Misappropriation includes:
(i) Acquisition of a trade secret of
another by a person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade
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secret was acquired by improper
means; or
(ii) Disclosure or use of a trade secret
of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) Used improper means to acquire
knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use,
knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) Derived from or through a person
who had utilized improper means to
acquire it;
(II) Acquired under circumstances
giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) Derived from or through a
person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his
position, knew or had reason to
know that it was a trade secret and
that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.34
In this regard "improper means" includes theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain
secrecy, or espionage through electronic or
other means.35
1. Disclosure or Use Without
Consent
Under either the UTSA or § 757 of the First
Restatement, disclosure or use of another's
trade secret constitutes misappropriation.
Misappropriation by disclosure or use without
consent often arises in situations where a
contract or confidential relationship exists, such
as employer-employee or licensor-licensee,
such that the party receiving trade secrets has a
duty to maintain the confidentiality of that
information. A receiving party who discloses
the trade secret information without the
owner's consent commits misappropriation.
For example, a former employee may
misappropriate his former employer's trade
secret by disclosing technical trade secret data
of his former employer.3 6 Similarly, an insurance
agent may misappropriate a former employer's
trade secret by disclosing policyholder
information.37 It is not necessary that the
defendant physically take possession of a
document containing the trade secret
information. Misappropriation can occur where
an employee memorizes a customer list and
uses his or her memory of that list in
competition with his or her ex-employer.38
"Use" of a trade secret is not limited to
directly copying another's trade secret in the
manufacture of a product. For example, where
a company alters a competitor's trade secret,
which it has wrongly obtained, that company
still "used" another's trade secret.39 A slight
alteration of a competitor's protected secret
implicates the same concerns as cases of
outright misappropriation. 4° Furthermore, "use"
occurs when a party uses a competitor's trade
secret information as a starting point for
producing its own, competing product.41 In
these circumstances, courts have recognized
the unfairness of permitting someone to
misappropriate the results of years of research
and development.42
2. Injunctive Relief Is Available for
Misappropriation
The UTSA provides injunctive relief for
trade secret misappropriation. The Act states
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that courts can enjoin misappropriation by an
injunction or by requiring the defendant to
perform. The Act reads:
(a) Actual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined.
Upon application to the court, an
injunction shall be terminated when
the trade secret has ceased to exist,
but the injunction may be continued
for an additional reasonable period of
time in order to eliminate commercial
advantage that otherwise would be
derived from the misappropriation.
(b) In exceptional circumstances, an
injunction may condition future use
upon payment of a reasonable royalty
for no longer than the period of time
for which use could have been
prohibited. Exceptional
circumstances include, but are not
limited to, a defendant's material and
prejudicial change of position prior to
acquiring knowledge or reason to
know of misappropriation that
renders a prohibitive injunction
inequitable.
(c) In appropriate circumstances,
affirmative acts to protect a trade
secret may be compelled by court
order.43
The comments to the UTSA provide:
Injunctions restraining future use and
disclosure of misappropriated trade
secrets are fiequently sought.
Although punitive perpetual
injunctions have been granted, § 2(a)
of this Act adopts the position of the
trend of authority limiting the
duration of injunctive relief to the
extent of the temporal advantage
over good-faith competitors gained
by misappropriation.
The general principle of § 2(a) and
(b) is that an injunction should last
for as long as is necessary, but no
longer than is necessary. The
injunction limitation was created to
eliminate the commercial advantage
or "lead time" with respect to good
faith competitors that a person has
obtained through misappropriation.
Subject to any additional period of
restraint necessary to negate lead
time, an injunction accordingly
should terminate when a former trade
secret becomes either generally
known to good-faith competitors or
generally knowable to them because
of the lawful availability of products
that can be reverse engineered to
reveal a trade secret.44
As with other areas of law, injunctive relief
in the trade secret context can be in the form of
a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction, or permanent injunction. Basically, a
motion for injunctive relief requires a court to
carefully weigh "four factors: (1) whether the
movant has shown a likelihood of a reasonable
probability of success on the merits; (2)
whether the movant will be irreparably injured
by denial of such relief; (3) whether granting
preliminary relief will result in even greater
harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether
granting preliminary relief will be in the public
interest."45 Notably, while some courts have
assumed irreparable harm in trade secret cases,
others have held that the UTSA provision
allowing injunctions on such equitable terms as
a court deems reasonable does not create an
exception from the general statutory
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requirement that injunctions can be granted
only upon a showing of irreparable harm.46
Injunctive relief should not go beyond the
need to protect the legitimate interests of a
trade secret owner and should not unduly
burden the defendant.47 In the normal case, a
successful trade secret plaintiff will receive
ongoing injunctive relief that prevents the
defendant from disclosing or using trade secrets
for a certain amount of time. "The duration and
scope of an injunction are decided upon the
facts of each case."48 Any information that the
defendant is prevented from using or disclosing
pursuant to the injunction cannot be publicly
available, such as through a patent or other
public disclosure of the trade secret owner.4 9
Further, the injunction cannot prevent the use
of trade secret information once the trade
secret is publicly disclosed. 0
Generally, an injunction should last for a
"period of time that would be reasonably
required for independent development" of the
trade secret information. 1 The plaintiff will
normally describe the length of time it took to
develop the information, whereas the defendant
will attempt to show that it could develop the
information more quickly. The duration of an
injunction can range from a few months, to a
few years,52 to perpetual. 53 With a perpetual or
"permanent" injunction, the court normally
"maintains jurisdiction to modify or revoke" the
injunction as circumstances dictate.54 Thus,
injunctive relief arms trade secret owners with
a powerful tool for protecting their proprietary
information.
III. The Employment Relationship
and Employee Mobility
A. The Doctrine of
Employment-at- Will
152 e Loyola Consumer Law Review
Courts generally recognize the concept of
employment-at-will.5 In the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement or other
contractual limitations, an employment
relationship is terminable at will. Pursuant to
the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer
can discharge a worker for any legal reason or
for no reason, with or without notice. Similarly,
a worker can resign from at-will employment at
any time for any reason or for no reason, with
or without notice. Many employment situations
involve at-will employment.5 6
The employment-at-will doctrine is premised
on the principles of freedom of choice and
equality of rights. Both parties to the
employment relationship have the freedom to
continue the relationship or to terminate it. This
freedom generally enhances business flexibility
by allowing employers unilaterally to alter their
work force, by downsizing, relocating
operations, responding to market conditions, or
otherwise, without liability to those employees
affected. Conversely, this freedom allows
employees, without fear of liability, to quit their
job, change jobs or accept new offers of
employment if a change is desirable or
necessary. The employment-at-will doctrine
satisfies the principle of equality of rights by
making the freedom of choice to continue or
discontinue the employment relationship mutual
as between employer and employee.
In addition, the employment-at-will doctrine
is market-oriented and serves to foster
competition and the movement of resources,
particularly workers, to their highest valued
use. Since the employer can terminate the
employment relationship at any time, workers
are encouraged to be productive and efficient
or else risk replacement. For their part,
employees have the freedom and right to
Volume 10, number 2
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consider and accept competing offers of
employment, thereby encouraging employers to
be competitive with other potential employers
in the terms, conditions, and benefits offered to
employees.
A variety of factors, including the emergence
of large corporate employers with specialized
job functions, employee expectations ofjob
tenure, and the decline in union representation
of the workforce, have contributed to a decline
in the popularity of the doctrine of
employment-at-will. 7 Accordingly, the doctrine
of employment-at-will is subject to several
limitations and exceptions, including:
1) The National Labor Relations Act, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of union
activity.58
2) Federal and state anti-discrimination
statutes, which prohibit employee discharges
that discriminate on the basis of specified
protected classes, such as race, gender,
religion, and national origin. The list of
protected classifications has grown over the
years and some state statutes now protect
against discrimination based on age, disability,
sexual orientation, and others.59 Many state and
federal statutes also limit the employment-at-
will doctrine by prohibiting termination in
reprisal for an employee exercising his or her
certain statutory rights.
3) Judicially crafted exceptions, which occur
in at least three categories: (i) contracts and
quasi-contracts, (ii) torts, and (iii) public
policy.6"
Through case-specific determinations, courts
have imposed several limitations on and
exceptions to the employment-at-will rule.
Most notable is the contract-based exception,
in which contractual obligations relating to job
security or disciplinary procedure are held to
limit the employer's authority to discharge an
employee. Contractual obligations may be
1998
found in oral statements, pre-employment
letters, employee handbooks, or a combination
of circumstances, such as past personnel
practices and longevity of service. Under this
exception, courts generally focus on the
legitimacy of an employee's expectations.
Additional limitations on the employment-at-
will rule are grounded in tort law. In these
cases, courts provide tort remedies for
discharges. For example, an employer may
discharge an employee in a manner that
defames the employee or that intentionally
inflicts emotional distress.61 A discharge may
also be based on reasons that violate public
policy.62 Finally, some courts have found that an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
arises from the employment relationship. 63 This
covenant requires that parties to a contract
refrain from acting in bad faith to frustrate one
another's expectations of receiving the benefits
of their bargains.
B. Contractual Limitations on
Employee Mobility
Given the ability of a worker to freely leave
or change employment under the at-will
employment doctrine, employers often seek to
impose limitations on a worker's ability to
leave his or her current employment or to
compete with the current employer after the
employment ends. These restrictions become
part of the employment contract and bind an
employee who has voluntarily agreed to them
for valid consideration.
1. Employment for a Term of Years
or Other Specified Period Binds
Employees
Adopting an explicit contractual term of
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years for the length of employment is the
clearest manner by which to limit an
employee's ability to exercise his or her
freedom to terminate the employment and
accept a job elsewhere. Thus, employers
sometimes give valued workers a contract that,
by its terms, is effective for a period of years.
Such a provision can prove beneficial for both
the employer and the employee in that it
provides security for both parties with respect
to their relationship for the period specified.
For example, an employee might be given a
two or three-year employment contract with an
option on the part of the employer to renew the
employment for a similar term. With this type
of contract, the presumption of at-will
employment is modified, the employer is not
free to discharge the employee, and the
employee is not free to leave the employment
without breaching the contract.
2. Non-Compete Clauses Limit
Employee Mobility
A second type of contractual provision often
used to restrict employee freedom is a non-
compete agreement (also known as a covenant
not to compete). 64 A "non-compete clause" is a
provision in an employment contract or
agreement by which the employee agrees not to
compete with the employer or work for a
competitor after termination of the employment
relationship.65 A non-compete agreement
operates after the employment relationship ends
and generally prohibits a former employee from
engaging in business activity competitive with
the former employer for a period of time in a
specified geographical area. The breach of a
non-compete clause often leads to inevitable
disclosure litigation. Section IV of this article
gives examples of this relationship between
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non-compete clauses and inevitable disclosure
issues.
The non-compete clause, unlike that
specifying a term of years, appears favorable to
the employer but not the employee because it
imposes restrictions only on the employee.
Additionally, these restrictions operate after the
employment has terminated to limit the
freedom of the employee to market his or her
services or practice his or her trade or
profession. The non-compete clause restricts
the employee's ability to sell labor, and deprives
the public of the competition and free trade that
would exist in the absence of such a contractual
provision. Nevertheless, many employers
require such agreements of key personnel
because of the importance of those personnel
to the employer's operations and the benefits
that such personnel could provide to a
competitor. Additionally, workers asked to
consent to this type of restriction may be able
to negotiate for increased salary or benefits in
return for entry into the non-competition
provision.
Legal analysis of non-competition
agreements in the employment setting is closely
linked to the analysis of non-competition
agreements in general.66 Traditionally, non-
compete agreements were "looked upon with
disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully
scrutinized." 67 The courts articulate two policy
reasons for their disfavor of non-compete
clauses: (1) the employee's right to sell his or
her own labor;6 and (2) the public's interest in
unimpeded trade.69 The former policy reason
recognizes that the employer usually has an
economic advantage over the employee. The
employee, in entering into a non-compete
agreement, may succumb to pressure and sign
away the right to work in the employment for
which the employee is most qualified. 70 The
Volume 10, number 2
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second policy rationale recognizes the
potentially negative impact of non-compete
clauses on competition in the marketplace. 71
Because of the impediment to free
competition that a non-compete agreement
involves, courts have generally been reluctant
to limit an employee's freedom based on such
provisions. Thus, courts will not enforce non-
compete agreements unless the agreements are
voluntarily executed by the employee and
supported by independent consideration.72
Moreover, the particular provision involved
must be necessary to protect the business of the
former employer.73 Even then, courts will only
enforce the restriction imposed to the extent it
is reasonable as to subject matter, time period,
and geographic application.74
a. Protection of Confidential
Information
The primary consideration in determining
whether to enforce a non-compete agreement is
whether the agreement strikes a reasonable
balance between the legitimate business
interests of the employer and the employee's
right to work. Despite the policy factors
weighing against the enforcement of non-
compete clauses, courts have long recognized
that some non-compete clauses are necessary
to protect the legitimate business interests of
the employer.75 Courts have described two
interests, in particular, as legitimate and worthy
of protection: (1) the employer's good will 76
and (2) confidential information such as trade
secrets.77
In the context of the current discussion,
courts have found that employers have a
legitimate business interest to protect when an
1998
employee had access during employment to
confidential information or trade secrets.78 The
role of non-compete clauses in protecting trade
secrets and their relationship to the inevitable
disclosure doctrine will be discussed in Part IV.
b. Enforceable Agreements Need to
be Reasonable
Even if a non-compete agreement furthers an
employer's legitimate business interest, the
courts generally will not enforce an agreement
which unreasonably restricts a former
employee's ability to earn a living.79 The typical
test applied by the courts involves a three-part
determination of reasonableness, analyzing: (1)
the nature and character of the employment
relationship; (2) the time restriction; and (3) the
geographic restriction."0
i. Nature and Character of
Employment Under the
Reasonableness Test
The first prong of the reasonableness
test focuses on the nature and character of the
employer-employee relationship. Relevant
considerations include: the employee's
bargaining power in the employment market;81
the likelihood of grievous harm to the
employee if the clause is enforced;8 2 the amount
of access the employee had to the employer's
business secrets and future plans;83 and the
amount of access the employee had to the
employer's customers."
Applying this test, one court enforced a non-
compete agreement by holding that a thirteen-
year employee of an employment agency who
had access to the clients and secrets of the
employer could not open a competing
employment agency business. 5 On the other
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hand, that same court invalidated a seemingly
similar non-compete clause. 6 In Eutectic
Welding Alloys Corp., the employer argued
that the competing ex-employee had been a
"technical representative" with access to
confidential information by virtue of his former
position. 7 The court "carefully scrutinized" the
nature and character of the employee's job and
found that it was basically that of a salesperson
and that the restraint imposed by the agreement
was "broader in scope than necessary to
protect a legitimate interest of the employer."88
In some cases, courts will not enforce a non-
compete clause if the clause is not tailored to
protect that business interest. This will occur
even though the nature and character of the
employment relationship reveals a legitimate
business interest. In one such case,8 9 the
employer, a real estate sales organization,
sought to enjoin a former employee from
working as a real estate broker. The court
found the non-compete clause unreasonable
because it did not also restrain the former
employee from working as a real estate
salesperson in which capacity he could just as
easily use knowledge gained from the former
employer. Because the clause would not
operate to protect the employer's legitimate
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of
information concerning its customers, the court
concluded that its true purpose must be to
hinder the former employee. 9
ii. Time and Geographic
Restrictions Under the Reasonableness
Test
The time and geographic restrictions
imposed by the agreement represent two other
important factors in determining whether a
non-compete clause is enforceable. Courts will
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analyze the specific restrictions imposed and
determine whether they are drawn in a manner
that restricts the employee only to the extent
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of
the employer.
There is general agreement on the analytical
framework for testing time and geographic
restrictions.9' The geographic restriction
typically should extend only to the area where
the employee had actually worked while
employed or the area encompassed by the
employer's business. The duration restriction is
sometimes tested under either of the following
alternative standards: "the length of time
necessary to obliterate the identification
between employer and employee in the minds
of the employer's customers [or] the length of
time necessary for an employee's replacement
to obtain licenses and learn the fundamentals of
the business."12
Courts will uphold competitive restrictions
that comport with these time and area
guidelines for reasonableness. In one case,9 for
example, the non-compete agreement signed by
the employee stipulated that he would not
compete after termination in any region in
which he had sold aluminum siding while
employed by the former employer. Because the
employee had pre-employment sales experience
in some of the areas encompassed by the
clause, the employer urged the court to adopt a
narrow reading of the non-compete clause. The
court enforced the clause to the extent
requested by the employer, stating that both the
time and geographic limitations were
reasonable.94
Courts are less likely to enforce a non-
compete agreement if either the time or
geographic restriction is greater than that
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate
business interests.9" For example, a court found
a work prohibition agreement overbroad where
Volume 10, number 2
Employee Beware: the Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
the agreement prohibited the employee, a disc
jockey, from working for any radio or
television station whose station, offices, or
antenna were located within a thirty-five mile
radius of any of the six U.S. cities where the
employer broadcasting company owned or
operated broadcasting stations for eighteen
months.96 The geographic restriction severely
limited the employee's ability to pursue future
employment in his chosen profession because it
eliminated several regions of the country as
possible locations for employment.97 In
addition, it was more restrictive than necessary
to serve the employer's legitimate business
interest because the disc jockey would be
recognized only by listeners in the one city in
which he had worked, not in the other five
cities in which the employer simply had
stations. Thus, the clause was overly restrictive
and went beyond the goal of protecting the
good will of the company.
Although overly broad non-compete clauses
are disfavored, the lack of a geographical
limitation does not render a covenant per se
unenforceable. 98 The lack of a territorial
restriction may be reasonably necessary in
certain instances, such as employment with
multi-national corporations.99 Accordingly,
courts will use a reasonableness analysis to
determine the enforceability of non-compete
clauses lacking geographical restrictions.
c. Remedies for Violations of Non-
Compete Clauses
i. Injunctive Relief
The most frequently invoked remedy for
breach of a non-compete clause is an injunction
that restrains the former employee from
violating the agreement. An injunction is
typically the preferred remedy because it is the
most effective method for eliminating the harm
to the employer.
An injunction may be either permanent or
temporary in nature. A court will issue a
permanent injunction if it finds after trial that a
non-compete clause is enforceable and that
irreparable harm will result in the absence of
injunctive relief.100 A court may extend the
injunction beyond the period specified in the
non-compete agreement if further harm to the
employer is likely to occur.'01
An employer may also seek temporary relief
while the case is still pending in the form of
either a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction. This type of relief is
typically sought in inevitable disclosure cases,
where employers believe ex-employees will
inevitably disclose the employer's trade secrets.
A court typically will grant a preliminary
injunction based upon a consideration of the
following factors:
(1) the nature of the relationship between the
parties before the dispute giving rise to the
request for relief;
(2) administrative burdens in enforcing a
temporary decree;
(3) whether the harm to be suffered by the
moving party if the preliminary injunction is
denied outweighs that inflicted on the non-
moving party if the injunction issues;
(4) the likelihood of success on the merits;
(5) the public interest.102
If an employer seeking preliminary relief can
show that the employee already has engaged in
competitive conduct prohibited by a non-
compete agreement, the court may infer
irreparable harm from such conduct and grant
the injunction. 103 This preference for early
injunctive relief recognizes that it often "is the
only effective way an employer can prevent
disclosure or use of confidential information or
Loyola University Chicago School ofLaw • 1571998
use of goodwill by a terminated employee."'
ii. Damages as a Remedy
A court also may award monetary damages
for breach of a non-compete agreement. Courts
find damage awards particularly appropriate in
situations where a former employee has already
injured the employer's business, rendering
prospective injunctive relief inadequate to
remedy the injury.' 05 In seeking damages, an
employer bears the burden of showing that its
monetary loss resulted from conduct prohibited
by the non-compete clause as opposed to some
other reason. 106
While punitive damages are not available in a
suit to enforce a non-compete clause, a court
may assess punitive damages against a third
party that tortiously assists the breach of a non-
compete covenant. For example, one court
ruled that a business engaged in tortious
interference with a contract was liable for
punitive damages where it knowingly hired two
individuals who had signed non-compete
clauses with their former employer and then
encouraged the employees to use confidential
trade secret information in violation of that
non-compete clause. 107
3. Importance of Negotiated
Restrictions on Employment
Contractual restrictions on an employee's
mobility serve several significant functions.
Fundamentally, negotiated restrictions clarify
the parties' obligations. The employer deals
with an employee with the knowledge and
comfort that the employee is bound to the
employer, either in terms of a period of
employment, or restriction on post-employment
activity. With this security, the employer can
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plan its use of the employee's services and can
involve the employee in significant and
confidential business decisions and operations.
The employer is encouraged to "invest" in the
employee through training or responsibility.
The security for this investment lies in the
negotiated contractual provisions tying the
employee to the employer.
For the employee, the clarity of contractual
limitations also serves to assist the employee's
planning process. The employee knows that the
employer is treating the employee as an
important participant in the business. With a
term of years employment contract, the
employee, secure in his or her position, can
"invest" in the employment by expending extra
effort or participating in education or training
programs.
An additional benefit of negotiated
restrictions is the ability of the worker to refuse
an initial offer of employment or seek adjusted
compensation to reflect the restriction. With a
non-compete covenant, as opposed to a term of
years contract, the employee will lack the
security of the current position. The employee
can, however, negotiate for benefits in
exchange for accepting the non-compete
requirement. For example, the employee may
be able to secure a term of years contract.
Alternatively, the employee may seek additional
compensation for the non-compete restriction
or have compensation continue during the non-
compete period. Ultimately, a worker who is
not satisfied with the benefit offered in
exchange for the non-compete provision can
seek employment elsewhere.
All the benefits of the planning process apply
to negotiated contractual restrictions. The
contracting parties are able to determine the
existence, nature, and extent of their own
obligations. Adjustments to the contractual
relationship can be made at the outset to reflect
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the various parts of the resulting agreement and
relationship. There is no surprise and no
disappointment of expectations. However,
courts can jeopardize all of these benefits by
applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine in
certain circumstances as described below.
IV The Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine
A. The Theory and Several Case
Examples
The basic theory of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine is as simple as it is devastating. The
inevitable disclosure doctrine posits that the
former employee will "inevitably disclose"
those trade secrets in his or her new position
with a competitor employer.0 8 The rationale of
inevitable disclosure is that even absent actual
misappropriation of trade secrets, and even
absent a negotiated non-compete agreement,
disclosure will occur because of the close
functional relation of the new employment to
the former position.
If a court accepts the premise of this
potential inevitable disclosure, then the former
employer can seek to enjoin the employee from
accepting the new employment. In terms of the
UTSA, injunctive relief is sought not because
trade secrets have actually been
misappropriated, but rather because of alleged
"threatened misappropriation" resulting from
the new employment. The misappropriation is
"threatened" not because the employee intends
to steal the former employer's trade secrets, but
rather because the employee cannot avoid such
misappropriation in performing his or herjob
responsibilities.
Using its equitable injunctive powers, a court
may grant an injunction, that is, enforce a
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judicially fashioned non-competition
agreement. The result is that the employee no
longer has the original employment and is
judicially prevented from accepting the new
employment. The original employer obtains the
benefit of a non-compete restriction without
bargaining for it or paying for it.
Probably the most prominent, though
certainly not the first, 10 inevitable disclosure
case is PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,"0 involving a
PepsiCo managerial employee, Redmond, who
left to work for The Quaker Oats Company.
Quaker and PepsiCo were competitors in the
sports drinks and "new age" drinks (non-
carbonated and tea-based fruit drinks)
categories, with Quaker producing Gatorade
and Snapple drinks and PepsiCo producing All
Sport and several others. While employed by
PepsiCo, Redmond had access to PepsiCo's
strategic financial, production, and marketing
plans for these products. Redmond was an at-
will employee and not bound by any non-
compete agreement.
PepsiCo sought a preliminary injunction
preventing Redmond from going to work in the
position he had accepted with Quaker, and the
trial court granted it."' On appeal, PepsiCo
argued that Redmond would inevitably disclose
its trade secrets if he was allowed to accept
employment with Quaker. In response,
Redmond and Quaker listed several facts,
which they claimed established that Redmond
would not inevitably disclose PepsiCo secrets.
For example, Redmond would be implementing
a pre-existing Gatorade and Snapple integration
plan. In addition, Redmond had signed a
confidentiality agreement with Quaker
precluding him from disclosing others' trade
secrets. Furthermore, Redmond had agreed to
seek the advice of Quaker's in-house counsel if
confronted with a situation that might involve
use or disclosure of PepsiCo confidential
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information.' 2
The Seventh Circuit noted that the primary
issue related to the likelihood of PepsiCo's
ultimate success on the merits of trade secret
misappropriation.'13 The Court also noted that
the UTSA allows a court to issue an injunction
on the basis of "threatened
misappropriation."" 4 Despite the fact that the
UTSA does not refer to "inevitable" disclosure
as a basis for relief, the court equated
"threatened" misappropriation with the
potential use of trade secrets by an employee in
the new employment; "a plaintiff may prove a
claim of trade secret misappropriation by
demonstrating that defendant's new
employment will inevitably lead him to rely on
the plaintiff's trade secrets. ' On this basis,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary
injunction, precluding Redmond from accepting
his negotiated employment with Quaker based
on a non-negotiated restriction imposed at the
behest of PepsiCo.
Subsequent to PepsiCo, other courts have
relied upon the theory of inevitable disclosure.
For example, in Uncle B " Bakery v.
O 'Rourke,116 an employee, O'Rourke, left one
company to work for a competitor. Despite the
lack of a non-compete restriction or actual
misappropriation, the court granted a
preliminary injunction to the employer because
"there is sufficient threat of irreparable harm in
this case to weigh in favor of enjoining both
disclosure of trade secrets and O'Rourke's
employment with Brooklyn Bagel Boys.' '117
Other courts have accepted the inevitable
disclosure theory, but found it inapplicable on
the particular facts of a given case." 8
B. Negative Effects of the Inevitable
Disclosure Analysis
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1. In General
Acceptance of the inevitable disclosure
analysis has deleterious effects, including
several that flow from the fact that most of
these cases are decided at the preliminary
injunction stage. A court grants a preliminary
injunction not on a finding of wrongdoing, but
rather on a likelihood of success. However, the
entry of the injunction may be tantamount to a
determination of ultimate relief. For example, if
a court enjoins an employee from accepting
new employment pending trial, and if the trial
does not occur for a number of months (or
even a year or longer), the employer, in
essence, wins.
The application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine also results in the judicial rewriting of
two employment agreements. First, the original
employer/employee contract is rewritten by the
addition of the non-compete terms of the
injunction. The employee is bound to a court-
fashioned contractual provision with no
corresponding opportunity to negotiate (or
even reject) the terms proffered. The employer
obtains the benefit of a contractual provision it
did not pay for. The significant value of that
benefit can be gauged by the employer's
willingness to engage in litigation to secure it.
Arguably, if the issue instead had been
addressed ex ante, the employer likely would
have been willing to increase the prospective
employee's compensation to avoid the cost
involved and uncertainty inherent in litigation.
In addition to the rewriting of the employer/
employee contract, the enforcement of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine also rewrites or
negates the worker's prospective contract with
the new employer. The worker and prospective
employer negotiate in terms of what the worker
is able to bring to the new organization.
Without a contractual term of years or non-
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compete restricting the worker from leaving the
new employment, the negotiations proceed,
even if the new employer is a competitor of the
current or former employer. When the courts
subsequently impose a judicially-fashioned non-
compete decree preventing or restricting the
new employment, they negate these
negotiations. The new employer either does not
get the new employee or gets a worker with
limitations that were not negotiated. It is no
answer to say that the new employer can
employ the worker in a different position or
different capacity. "9 That is not what the new
employer sought and probably is not what it
wants.
Most fundamentally, however, application of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine creates
significant uncertainty in the labor market. The
determination of whether trade secrets exist
and whether their protection is warranted
through preliminary injunctive relief is
inherently a fact-intensive and fact-specific
determination. Moreover, the stakes escalate as
the position of the employee involves more
responsibility and access to an employer's
operations. The former employer that has not
protected itself in advance has an incentive to
seek injunctive relief because the nature of the
fact-finding process gives it a reasonable basis
for requesting relief. Even if it loses, the former
employer has hampered the former employee
and the new employer through the cloud of the
litigation process.
Prospective employers, on the other hand,
must not only look to the agreements their
prospective employees had with past
employers, but also to what claims those
former employers can make even in the absence
of contractual restrictions. Prospective
employers must attempt to weigh the likelihood
and expense of being involved in expensive
litigation as part of the cost they incur in hiring
a new employee, particularly one with technical
or management expertise. These costs do not
result in productive benefit and make the
worker appear less attractive to employ.
Ultimately, workers are the big losers. They
may have the theoretical freedom to leave their
current employment, but, in reality, they are
restricted through subsequent inevitable
disclosure exposure. This potential represents
an extra cost of switching jobs. Moreover, the
worker may actually be prevented from
accepting the new employment, or be forced to
accept work outside the area of his or her
highest valued use, namely, competing with the
former employer on behalf of the new
employer. In extreme case, the worker may
simply be out of ajob, period.
Application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine chills competition for workers by
exposing workers, former employers, and
prospective employers to costly and uncertain
litigation. Workers lose through lost
opportunities, and the economy loses by
decreased competition, which can lead
ultimately to higher consumer prices in the
market.
These negative effects alone may or may not
be sufficient to justify rejection or restriction of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. These
effects, however, need to be at least considered
in deciding whether the doctrine is justified in
its use, especially given that the doctrine is
applied not to remedy a wrong or compensate
for an injury that has taken place. Rather, when
it is applied, the inevitable disclosure doctrine
serves to prevent a perceived potential harm
from occurring. In this light the negative effects
of the doctrine's application, if not dispositive,
deserve significant weight in the calculus.
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2. The California Situation
Potential application of the inevitable
disclosure doctrine in California presents
particularly interesting questions. California is
regarded as a place where significant
technological research and development occur,
thereby giving rise to numerous potential trade
secret lawsuits. California, however, prohibits
non-compete provisions by statute, except in
limited circumstances. 120
California's rejection of contractual non-
compete agreements as they relate to workers
should be commended on many levels. First, it
brings clarity to an otherwise murky area of
jurisprudence. Second, by rejecting these
provisions, California fosters maximum
freedom for workers, thereby enhancing their
bargaining position with potential employers
and creating competition among employers for
workers. This encourages employers to provide
positive incentives for worker stability, such as
higher wages, contracts for a period of years,
or even giving employees an ownership interest
in the company.21 Finally, California's rejection
of non-compete clauses also recognizes that
workers may not be in an advantageous
position to negotiate these terms of a contract
or may not focus on their significance when
commencing employment.
California courts, however, have not always
invalidated contractual restrictions on former
employees. Even with the statutory prohibition
in place, courts have upheld contractual
provisions that serve to protect trade secrets.
For example, a court has upheld an agreement
not to use a customer list for a period of time
after employment, determining that it was
necessary to protect the former employer's
trade secrets. 122 An employee cannot disclose
his former employer's confidential customer
lists or other trade secrets, and cannot solicit
those customers.
23
As discussed above, the inevitable disclosure
doctrine transforms employee access to trade
secrets into a defacto non-competition
agreement. If accepted by the California courts,
contractual non-competition agreements could
be upheld under the guise of protecting trade
secrets despite the statutory mandate that such
agreements are generally void. Also, the
inevitable disclosure doctrine could be used to
prevent workers from accepting new
employment with a competitive company even
where no contractual restriction exists, that is,
by court-ordered preliminary injunctive relief.
In any event, the possibility of such a
conclusion once again serves to chill the market
for workers and limits their mobility, a result
directly at odds with the purposes of the
California statute.
C. Defects in the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine
If, as urged herein, application of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine represents an
unfortunate and dangerous development in
intellectual property law, what are the
weaknesses in the analysis used by the courts in
applying it? There are at least two major
problems with the way in which courts have
applied the inevitable disclosure analysis. The
first problem relates to their interpretation of
the justification for granting relief under the
UTSA. The second relates to the manner in
which trade secrets, as predictable interests, are
defined, and the failure of employers to take
reasonable precautions to protect these
interests.
1. Relieffor "Threatened"
162 e Loyola Consumer Law Review Volume 10, number 2
Employee Beware: the Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Misappropriation
At common law, trade secrets were
protected in two ways: (1) as a legitimate
business interest protected by non-compete
clauses, and (2) through the common law tort
of misappropriation.'24 The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, while sharing many characteristics
with the traditional misappropriation cause of
action, preempts the common law tort. More
importantly, the UTSA allows courts to grant
relief not only for actual misappropriation of
trade secrets, but also provides that "threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined.' 1 25 One
important key to identifying the weakness of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine is to focus on
the meaning of the term "threatened" as used in
the UTSA. After all, courts have relied upon
this term in granting injunctive relief for
perceived inevitable disclosure.
The primary definition of "threaten" is "to
make threats against; express one's intention of
hurting, punishing, etc." or "to express
intention to inflict" harm. 126 In legal terms, the
primary definition of "threat" is a "declaration
of intention or determination to inflict
punishment, loss, or pain on another, or to
injure another by the commission of some
unlawful act.' ' 27 The sense of these terms is
that there is some action or expression by the
subject party to indicate an intention to violate
another's rights.
Instead of relying on the primary
understanding and definition of the word
threaten, courts granting relief in inevitable
disclosure cases rely on a secondary meaning of
the term. According to that definition, threaten
means "to be a menacing indication of' or "to
be a source of such danger, harm, etc."' 128 And a
legal definition of threat in this manner is a
"menace; especially, any menace of such a
nature and extent as to unsettle the mind of the
person on whom it operates."' 29 This secondary
definition identifies a status, not an act or
intent. As stated by the court in PepsiCo v.
Redmond, "Redmond cannot help but rely on..
• [PepsiCo's] trade secrets" in his new job. 130
No doubt many former employers perceive a
lost employee as a threat in this secondary
manner and this perception forms the basis of
inevitable disclosure suits.
The primary definition of "threaten" should
guide the courts in granting relief under the
UTSA. First, this interpretation of the term
"threatened" in the UTSA is consistent with the
action that must be threatened, namely,
"misappropriation." Misappropriation is an
action, not a status. Someone who displays an
intent to violate another's rights threatens
misappropriation.
More fundamentally, defining the threat of
misappropriation in terms of the employee's
status is fundamentally unfair to the employee.
It allows an employer, by giving trade secrets
to a worker, to thereby plant the seeds by
which the worker will subsequently be
prevented from gainful employment with a
competitor. Furthermore, the employee has no
notice that access to confidential information or
other trade secrets will have such an effect, as
would be required to execute a non-
competition agreement.
Employment under these circumstances is
misleading. The employee accepts the original
employment with no indication that he or she
will be restricted in leaving that employment.
The employer's trade secrets, as protected by
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, serve as a
latent defect in the employment relationship.
When the employee later tries to switch jobs,
this defect serves to harm the worker by
restricting that opportunity. Thus, an employee
who has not actually misappropriated trade
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secrets and who has not threatened
misappropriation in the traditional, active, sense
of that term, may have his or her employment
mobility severely restricted simply by the status
of having been employed by another company
and having been in a position where trade
secrets were disclosed to him or her as part of
that former employment. "Threatened
misappropriation," as that term is used in the
UTSA, should require more.
One suggestion is that for "threatened
misappropriation" to exist, the employee must
evidence some bad faith in switching jobs, such
as taking confidential documents with him or
her. Even the PepsiCo case could be
distinguished on this basis, since the trial court
found, as the Seventh Circuit noted, that
Redmond had lied to PepsiCo concerning the
circumstances surrounding his departure, thus
evidencing bad faith. 11
2. Reasonable Efforts to Secure
Secrecy of Trade Secrets
As discussed earlier, the UTSA definition of
trade secret requires that the purported trade
secret must be "the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy."' 32 If an employer does not
implement reasonable efforts to protect its
alleged trade secrets, by definition no trade
secrets exist. If no trade secrets exist, the
employer is not entitled to protection by way of
injunctive relief under the inevitable disclosure
doctrine.
The employer knows what its trade secrets
are and the harm that might result from their
use or disclosure outside the company. The
prospective employee does not. Given the
presumptive at-will nature of employment,
what efforts are reasonable to protect trade
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secrets from potential use by employees in
alternative employment situations?
A confidentiality agreement is only a partial
solution. Confidentiality agreements highlight
for the employees that they are being given
confidential information or trade secrets. These
agreements also add a contractual obligation to
the employee's fiduciary responsibilities during
the term of employment. A confidentiality
agreement does not, however, restrict the
employee from leaving at-will employment.
As Part III. B. explains, employers have
several means available to contractually restrict
employee mobility. Either a term of years or a
negotiated non-compete provision will suffice.
Employers are well aware of these options and
use them in many circumstances. They could
use them just as well to protect their trade
secrets from being disclosed by an employee
leaving to work for a competitor. In fact,
protection of trade secrets is one of the primary
purposes of a non-compete provision. But
employers who require such agreements may
have to compensate employees for the
restriction, thereby increasing the employer's
cost of employment but benefitting the
employee in the process.
Given that the employer alone knows the
extent and value of a trade secret and given
that contractual means are available to restrict
disclosure by limiting employee mobility, it is
suggested that the failure of an employer to
obtain these contractual protections is
tantamount to a failure to employ "efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy." '133 Put another way, if the
disclosure of an employer's trade secrets by an
employee who leaves to work for a competitor
is "inevitable," then the employer can foresee
that circumstance. If the employer fails to
protect against such "inevitable" disclosure by
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contractually limiting the ability of the
employee to switch jobs, it has not used
reasonable efforts to protect its trade secrets
and should not be entitled to protection under
the inevitable disclosure doctrine or otherwise.
In IBM v. Seagate Technology,134 a former
IBM employee, Bonyhard, left IBM to work
for Seagate, a competitor. Although Bonyhard
was not subject to a contractual non-compete
provision, IBM sought a preliminary injunction
to prevent Bonyhard from working for Seagate.
The court refused: "Merely possessing trade
secrets and holding a comparable position with
a competitor does not justify an injunction. A
claim of trade secret misappropriation should
not act as an ex post facto covenant not to
compete."' 35
Even more directly on point is Merck & Co.
v. Lyon. 3 6 In that case, Merck sought to
prevent a former employee, Lyon, from
working for a competitor. Merck sought a
preliminary injunction, arguing inevitable
disclosure. In reviewing the efforts undertaken
by Merck to protect its trade secrets, the court
stated that Merck "could have... pursued a
contract including a covenant not to
compete"' 37 but did not. Instead, all that existed
was a confidentiality agreement.
Despite finding that the employee's memory
of alleged trade secrets was sufficient to show
that he or she had knowledge of the trade
secret and despite concluding that
misappropriation was likely because it would
be inevitable in the new position, the court
denied a preliminary injunction preventing the
new employment. "[I]t must be pointed out that
plaintiffs did not seek a non-competition
agreement from Lyon. [P]laintiffs must rely on
their confidentiality agreement with Lyon. The
Court cannot add to that agreement a covenant
not to compete." '138
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D. The Proper Role for the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
Up to this point, this article has urged courts
to not apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine
to prevent employees from accepting
alternative employment where the original
employer has not contractually limited the
employee's mobility. There is, however, a place
where application of the inevitable disclosure
concept does make sense, namely in
determining whether to enforce an otherwise
valid non-compete agreement.
For example, in Medtronic, Inc. V. Sun,139 a
former Medtronic employee, Sun, wanted to
work for Medtronic's primary competitor. Sun,
who had agreed to a two-year non-compete
provision, argued that the provision could not
be enforced merely to prevent potential or
inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential information. The court rejected this
argument and enforced the agreement because
no actual use of the trade secrets was required.
The likely inevitable disclosure of this
confidential information was enough to justify
the agreement. 140
In another case, Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith,4'
Lumex sought a preliminary injunction to
enforce a six-month non-compete agreement.
In upholding the non-compete covenant as a
reasonable restriction, the court determined
that no actual harm to Lumex was required.
Rather, because disclosure of Lumex's trade
secrets in the former employee's new position
would be inevitable, the court granted
enforcement. The court specifically rejected the
claim that the non-compete covenant could not
be enforced unless the employee had evidenced
an intent to divulge trade secrets or otherwise
acted in bad faith. Rather, enforcement was
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justified because the "court finds that
Highsmith will inevitably divulge [Lumex] trade
secrets and confidential information.' '142
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has
explained that where an employer takes the
precaution of having an employee sign a non-
compete clause, it need not prove the existence
of a trade secret in order to enforce the non-
compete clause. 143 Thus, in cases where the
parties have entered into a non-compete
agreement, the employer has a lower burden of
proof than if suing in a tort action for
misappropriation of a trade secret, and need
only show that the employee had access to
confidential information. '44
It is most logical that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine be applied in these
circumstances. The employer has protected
itself and its trade secrets through a non-
compete provision. The employee knows of,
and arguably has been compensated for, the
resultant restricted mobility. The package
purchased by accepting the original
employment is fully disclosed. There is no
latent or hidden defect in the process or the
resulting agreement. The non-compete
provision should be enforced based on a finding
of inevitable disclosure of trade secrets in the
new employment.
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